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1960] RECENT CASES
Today, an absolute divorce may cut off a wife's dowery interest,' 2 or her
homestead right.1" For this reason a number of jurisdictions allow alimony to
be used as compensation to the wife for the loss of property interest.14 Where
the wife obtains a property settlement at the time of divorce, alimony termin-
ates at the death of the husband. 15
In summery it may be said that although the courts state as a principle
that there must be strict compliance with the statutes in alimony decrees, a
good measure of descretion is given the courts by North Dakota statute.16
Provisions should be made in the divorce decree awarding the wife her
equitable share of the family property and in some cases alimony should be
granted to the wife for the duration of her life. However, it is better to pro-
vide for a property settlement at the time of the divorce and award alimony
to the wife, only if she is in need of support, such alimony terminating at
the husband's death.
F C. ROHRICH
OFFICERS - Rimirrs, POWERS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES - OCCUPANCY OF
OFICE By DE FACTO OFFICER - EFFECT ON COMPENSATION OF M) JURE
OFFICER. - In an election dispute between plaintiff, the incumbent highway
surveyor, and his election opponent, the opponent was appointed by the
town council to replace the plaintiff. State law provided that plaintiff should
continue in office for an additional two years or until a successor was duly
elected and qualified.' Plaintiff did not acquiesce in the opponent's appoint-
ment and was reinstated after bringing quo warranto proceedings, but the
town council refused his claim for compensation for the time he was out of
office. The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, held
that payment of the salary to the de facto surveyor did not discharge the town
from its liability to the de jure officer for the period during which he was
excluded from office. LaBelle v. Hazard, 160 A.2d 723 (R. I. 1960).
The common law and majority rule in this country is that if a public body
pays to a. de facto officer 2 compensation to which the holder of an office is
entitled, it is not bound to pay such compensation again to the de jure
officer when he succeeds in having his right to the office judicially established.3
12. Gum v. Gum, 122 Va. 32, 94 S.E. 177 (1917).
13. N.D. Rev. Code § 14-0525 (1943).
14. Sickey v. Sickey, 329 Mich. 51, 44 N.W.2d 867 (1950); Tyson v. Tyson, 283
Mich. 192, 277 N.W. 882 (1938).
15. Borton v. Borton, 230 Ala. 630, 162 So. 529 (1935). See Johnson v. Johnspn, 57
Kan. 343, 46 Pac. 700 (1896) "Alimony and a division of the property of the parties is
essentially a different thing."
16. N.D. Rev. Code § 14-0524 (1943) "When a divorce is granted, the court shall
make such equitable distribution of the real and personal property of the parties as may
seem just and proper, and may compel either of the parties to provide for the maintenance
of the children of the marriage, and to make such suitable allowances to the other party
for support during life or for a shorter period as to the circumstances of the parties
respectively. The court from time to time may modify its orders in these respects."
1. Public Laws of Rhode Island, 1948, c. 1998.
2. The rule applies only to officers and not to employees. For distinction between the
two see Francis v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 250 Iowa 1300, 98 N.W.2d
733 (1959); Mootz v. Belyea, 60 N.D. 741, 236 N.W. 358 (1931).
3. Peru v. State, 210 Ind. 668, 199 N.E. 151 (1935); Brown v. Tama County, 122
Iowa 745, 98 N.W. 562 (1904); Saline County v. Anderson; 20 Kan. 298, 27 Am.Rep.
171 (1878); Bowlin v. Franklin County, 152 Miss. 534, 120 So. 453 (1929); Hallowell
v. Buffalo County, 101 Neb. 250, 162 N.W. 650 (1917).
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The de jure officer's remedy is limited to an action against the de facto officer
and the fact that the de facto officer is insolvent does not affect the applica-
tion of the majority rule.4 The basis of the rule is said to be public policy-
the public should not be compelled to pay for the same services twice.5 It is
felt that public services cannot be performed efficiently unless prompt pay-
ment is made to public officers for their services and that public fiscal
officers should not be required to obtain a judicial determination of an office-
holders right to his salary before paying him.6
A very vocal minority hold that in the absence of waiver or estoppel, pay-
ment to a de facto officer is no defense to an action by the de jure officer
for the salary of an office from which he has been wrongfully excluded.7
The minority also base their rule on public policy, stating that no public good
can be served by denying to a public officer his compensation merely because
it has been wrongfully paid to one who was not entitled to receive it and
who, if he has received it, is not entitled to keep it. s A leading minority case
is Ness v. City of Fargo,' in which the Supreme Court of North Dakota held
that the salary of a public officer is an incident to the office and the right to
receive or enforce payment thereof goes with the legal title of the office. In
this case, as in the principal case and most of the minority rule cases, the
paying agency had notice of the dispute concerning the office and the de jure
officer at all times sought to enforce his right to the office. But some minority
cases hold that payment to the de facto officer is no defense even if the pay-
ing agency had no notice of the contest because the de jure officer did not
contest his removal promptly. 1° Conversely, some majority cases hold that
payment to the de facto officer is a defense even in the event of such notice, 1
but it is generally held that such payment must have been made in good faith
to constitute a defense.12 The court in the Ness case implies by way of dicta
that North Dakota might steer a middle course between the two rules when
it states: "It may be true that a de jure officer who has been excluded from
office should be held to a stricter standard of conduct in order to be in a
position to insist upon his legal right to salary where the office has been occu-
pied by a defacto officer who has received payment for the services performed
than in other classes of cases, and that the principles of waiver and estoppel
may be applied against a de jure officer where they might not be applied in
other cases . . ."13 This seems to indicate that in a proper case North Dakota
4. Saline County v. Anderson, supra note 3; Bowlin v. Franklin County, supra note 3.
5. Capitol Managers v. Rusan, 72 Colo. 197, 210 Pac. 328 (1922); Brown v. Tama
County, 122 Iowa 745, 98 N.W. 562 (1904).
6. Peru v. State, 210 Ind. 668, 199 N.E. 151 (1935).
7. Memphis v. Woodward, 12 Heisk. 499, 27 Am.Rep. 750 (1873); Markus v. City
of Duluth, 138 Minn. 225, 164 N.W. 906 (1917); Ness v. City of Fargo, 64 N.D. 231,
251 N.W. 843 (1933); Board of County Commissioners v. Litton,. 315 P.2d 239 (Okla.
1957).
8. Ness v. City of Fargo, supra note 7.
9. 64 N.D. 231, 251 N.W. 842 (1933).
10. Cowan v. State, 57 Wyo. 309, 116 P.2d 854 (1941).
11. Saline County v. Anderson, 20 Kan. 298, 27 Am.Rep. 171 (1878); Bowlin v.
Franklin County, 152 Miss. 534, 120 So. 453 (1929).
12. Glenn v. Chambers, 244 Iowa 750, 56 N.W.2d 892 (1953); Markus v. City of
Duluth, 138 Minn. 225, 164 N.W. 906 (1917). Contra, Hittell v. City of Chicago, 327
Ill. 443, 158 N.E. 683 (1927) (Good faith in paying the salary to de facto incumbent
is not necessary to relieve public body from obligation to pay de jure officer for the
period before there was a judicial determination as to who was the de jure officer).
13. Ness v. City of Fargo, 64 N.D. 231, 251 N.W. 843, 845 (1933).
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courts might hold that the public is not liable to a de jure officer during a
period when he did not assert his right to office.14
Considering the relative infrequency of these cases it would seem that
no public interest will be disserved by requiring a public body to pay to a de
jure officer the compensation of the office to which he was elected and to
which he has always maintained his right, even if this results in the salary
being paid twice.
ThI~OTHY Q. DAvIEs
14. See City of Tulsa v. Emery Johnson, 196 Okla. 213, 163 P.2d 993 (1945);
Chandler v. Hughes County, 9 S.D. 24, 67 N.W. 946 (1896).
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